PriFi  is an anonymous communication network, developped at the EPFL and Yale University. It protects your privacy by preventing your employers, ISPs and the governements from tracking what you are doing on the Internet; more precisely, it hides the source of your communications. Conceptually close to Tor , PriFi aims to provide lower latency and better anonymity, and is tailored for WLANs and LANs.
Get PriFi : github.com/lbarman/prifi
PriFi is under active development; feel free to contact us if you want to contribute !
What PriFi provides
- Strong anonymity between the users of a PriFi network (typically, the member of an organization or a company).
- Tracking protection against eavesdroppers such as : a rogue employee, someone doing a parking lot attack, your company or Internet Service Provider, or governemental organization.
- Protection against equivocation attacks
How it works
PriFi is build upon Dining Cryptographer Networks , a cryptographic primitive that provides perfect anonymity.1 It is tailored for WLANs and LANs, hence it works best at your company, university campus, or in your home. PriFi works like a trustless VPN : install it on the computers of your users, and it anonymizes any kind of traffic transparently.
PriFi uses a client-server infrastructure for performance and security. It relies mostly on existing infrastructure : a relay/router, a set of clients, and some additional servers. Those public servers, located anywhere on the planet, are not fully trusted; to be precise, they are in the anytrust model .
Those servers provide security; the first interesting property is the anytrust model, which means that as long as any one of the selected server is honest, PriFi will keep its security guarantees. In practice, your organization can select a set of server it trusts; those servers can get compromized, as long as not all of them are compromized, PriFi delivers strong anonymity.
The second interesting property is the path taken by the data; unlike Tor and other mixnets, the anonymized data does not go through the servers. This is important since the latency to those server is usually orders of magnitude above the latency in a WLAN/LAN; In PriFi, this high latency path matters only at setup. Once the setup phase is done, the packets from the clients to the Internet follow their usual path, with no added hop that would increases latency.
1 This construction provides perfect anonymity; in particular, it is resistant to traffic-analysis attacks , unlike Tor (and other systems). Those attacks exploit differences in traffic flows between users, and are an effective way to de-anonymize users.
Prof. Bryan Ford
Prof. Joan Feigenbaum
Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- github.com/lbarman/prifi used for the source code of PriFi.
- github.com/lbarman/prifisim_dev used for the simulator PriFi-Sim.
- git.epfl.ch/repo/prifi.git used for the papers and presentations.
Request access to: Italo, or Ludovic.
-  Barman, Ludovic; Zamani, Mahdi; Dacosta, Italo; Feigenbaum, Joan; Ford, Bryan; Hubaux, Jean-Pierre and Wolinsky, David. PriFi: A Low-Latency and Tracking-Resistant Protocol for Local-Area Anonymous Communication. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
-  Dingledine, Roger; Mathewson, Nick and Syverson, Paul. Tor: The second-generation onion router.
-  Chaum, David. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of cryptology
-  Wolinsky, David I; Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry; Ford, Bryan and Johnson, Aaron. Scalable anonymous group communication in the anytrust model.
-  Raymond, Jean-François. Traffic analysis: Protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems. Springer
-  DeDiS Lab, EPFL. Secure Distributed Algorithm. https://github.com/dedis/cothority